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Abstract
In two recent papers Barry Loewer (2001, 2004) has suggested to
interpret probabilities in statistical mechanics as Humean chances in
David Lewis’ (1994) sense. I first give a precise formulation of this
proposal, then raise two fundamental objections, and finally conclude
that these can be overcome only at the price of interpreting these
probabilities epistemically.
1 Introduction
Consider a gas that is adiabatically isolated from its environment and
confined to the left half of a container. Then remove the wall separat-
ing the two parts. The gas will immediately start spreading and soon
be evenly distributed over the entire available space. The gas has ap-
proached equilibrium. Thermodynamics (TD) characterises this pro-
cess in terms of an increase of thermodynamic entropy, which attains
its maximum value at equilibrium. The Second Law of thermodynam-
ics captures the irreversibility of this process by positing that in an
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isolated system such as the gas entropy cannot decrease. The aim
of statistical mechanics (SM) is to explain the behaviour of the gas,
and in particular its conformity with the Second Law, in terms of the
dynamical laws governing the individual molecules of which the gas is
made up. In what follows these laws are assumed to be the ones of
Hamiltonian classical mechanics.
We should not, however, ask for an explanation of the the Second
Law literally construed. This law is a universal law and as such cannot
be explained by a statistical theory. But this is not a problem because
we can rest content if we explain the ‘Boltzmannian version’ of the
second law (Callender 1999), which I call ‘Boltzmann’s Law’ (BL):
Consider an arbitrary instant of time t and assume that
at that time the Boltzmann entropy SB(t) of the system is
low. It is then highly probable that at any time t′ > t we
have SB(t′) > SB(t).
What notion of probability is invoked in BL and what reasons do
we have to believe that the claim it makes is true? The orthodox an-
swer is that probabilities are time averages and that entropy is likely
to increase because, assuming that the system is ergodic, the system
is in equilibrium most of the time. This view is now widely believed
to be untenable due to both conceptual problems and its invocation of
ergodicity (see Earman and Re´dei (1996) and van Lith (2001) for dis-
cussions). A propensity interpretation of SM probabilities is ruled out
by the fact that the underlying micro-theory, Hamiltonian mechanics,
is deterministic: Popper’s and Miller’s hand-waving notwithstanding,
this is incompatible with there being propensities (Clark 2001). Fre-
quentism has never been seriously put forward as an interpretation of
SM probabilities because mechanical systems do not satisfy von Mises’
independence requirement. Finally, so-called ‘no-theory-theories’ do
not improve the situation because at least in the context of physi-
cal theories they do not provide an independent alternative to other
accounts (Frigg and Hoefer 2007).
In two recent papers Loewer (2001, 2004) has suggested that the
way out of this deadlock is to build on David Lewis’ (1986, 1994)
approach and interpret SM probabilities as Humean chances. In this
paper I first give a precise formulation of Loewer’s proposal, then
raise two fundamental objections, and finally conclude that these can
2
be overcome only at the price of interpreting SM probabilities epis-
temically.
2 Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics
The microstate of a system consisting of n particles is specified by a
point in its 6n-dimensional phase space Γ, which is endowed with the
Lebesgue measure µL (its ‘natural’ measure).
1 The dynamics of the
system is governed by Hamilton’s equations of motion, which define
a measure-preserving phase flow φt on Γ; that is, φt: Γ → Γ is a
one-to-one mapping for every real number t and µL(φt(B)) = µL(B)
for every measurable set B ⊆ Γ. In what follows we assume that the
relevant physical process begins at a particular instant t0 and I adopt
the convention that ‘φt(x)’ denotes the state of the system at time
t0 + t if it was in state x at t0, and likewise for ‘φt(B)’. Similarly,
‘φ−t(x)’ denotes the denotes the state at time t0 which gets mapped
onto x at time t0 + t under the dynamics of the system, and likewise
for φ−t(B). In a Hamiltonian system energy is conserved and hence
the motion of the system is confined to the 6n− 1 dimensional energy
hypersurface ΓE . The measure µL can be restricted to ΓE , which
induces a natural and invariant measure µ on ΓE .
The macrostates Mk, k = 1, ...,m, of the system (where m <∞),
characterised by the values of macroscopic parameters, are assumed
to supervene on the system’s microstates. Therefore each Mk is asso-
ciated with a region ΓMk ⊆ ΓE so that the system is in macrostateMk
at t iff its mictostate x at t lies within ΓMk . The ΓMk form a partition
of ΓE , meaning that they do not overlap and jointly cover ΓE .
By definition, SB(Mk) := kB log[µ(ΓMk)] is the Boltzmann en-
tropy of macrostate Mk (where kB is the Boltzmann constant). Be-
cause the ΓMk don’t overlap it follows that a system is in exactly one
macrostate at any given time t and for this reason it makes sense
to talk about the Boltzmann entropy SB(t) of a system at time t:
SB(t) := kB log[µ(ΓMt)], where Mt is the system’s macrostate at time
t (i.e. Mt is the Mk for which it is the case that x ∈ ΓMk , where x
is the system’s microstate at t). The Boltzmann entropy assumes its
maximum for the equilibrium state.
1For a short introduction to Boltzmannian SM see Lebowitz (1993).
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To rationalise Boltzmann’s law we need to introduce probabilities.
The standard way to do this is by appeal to the so-called ‘Statistical
Postulate’ (SP):
Let Mt be the system’s macrostate at time t. Then the
probability at time t that the system’s microstate lies in
B ⊆ ΓMt is pt(B) = µ(B)/µ(ΓMt).
Now consider the set F of all microstates in ΓMt which in the near
future evolve towards macrostates M ′ that have higher Boltzmann
entropy than Mt. With the assumption that µ(F )/µ(ΓMk) ≈ 1 for all
k it follows from SP that for all t the system is highly likely to evolve
towards a state of higher entropy, which is exactly what BL asserts.
Whether or not this assumption holds true in a particular system
is a substantial question. However, even if it does there is a problem.
It follows from the time reversal invariance of Hamilton’s equations
of motion that if it is true that the system is overwhelmingly likely
to evolve towards a macrostate of higher entropy in the future, it is
also overwhelmingly likely to have evolved into the current macrostate
from a past macrostate M ′′ which also has higher entropy. This flies
in the face everyday experience and leads to wrong retrodictions.
Albert (2000, 71-96) suggests fixing this problem by first taking the
system under investigation to be the entire universe and then adopting
the so-called Past Hypothesis (PH), the postulate that the universe
came into being in a low entropy macrostate, the Past State, which
is provided to us by modern Big Bang cosmology. The problems with
flawed retrodictions can then be avoided by conditionalising on the
Past State. From a technical point of view, this amounts to replac-
ing SP with what I call the ‘Past Hypothesis Statistical Postulate’
(PHSP):
Let Mt be the system’s macrostate at time t. SP is valid
for the Past State Mp, which obtains at time t0. For all
times t > t0 the probability at time t that the system’s
microstate lies in B is pt(B|Rt) = µ(B ∩Rt)/µ(Rt), where
Rt :=Mt ∩ φt(Mp).
In what follows I refer to these probabilities as ‘PHSP probabili-
ties’. This principle is used to make predictions about the system’s
future by choosing B to be the set of those microstates that behave
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in the desired way. For instance, if choose B to be the set F (as de-
fined above), pt(F ) is the probability that the system’s entropy will
increase in the near future given PH. If this probability comes out high
for all Mk we have explained BL. Again, whether or not this is the
case is a substantive question having to do with both the construction
of the macrostates as well as the dynamics of the system. However,
the problems I discuss in this paper are orthogonal to this issue and
so I assume for the sake of argument that this assumption bears out
in systems of interest.2
3 Humean Chance
The basis for Lewis’ theory of probability is the so-called Humean
mosaic, the collection of all non-modal and non-probabilistic actual
events making up the world’s entire history (from the very beginning
to the very end) and upon which all other facts supervene. Lewis him-
self suggested that the mosaic consists of space-time points plus local
field quantities representing material stuff. In a classical mechanical
system the Humean mosaic simply consist of the trajectory of the sys-
tem’s microstate in phase space, on which the system’s macrostates
supervene.
The next element of Lewis’ theory is a thought experiment. To
make this explicit – more explicit than it is in Lewis’ own presenta-
tion – I introduce a fictitious creature, Lewis’ Demon. In contrast to
human beings who can only know a small part of the Humean mosaic,
Lewis’ Demon knows the entire mosaic. The demon now formulates
various deductive systems which make true assertions about what is
the case, and, perhaps, also about what the probability for certain
events are. Then the demon is asked to choose the best among these
systems. The laws of nature are the true theorems of this system and
the chances for certain events to occur are what the probabilistic laws
of the best system say they are (Lewis 1994, 480). Following Loewer,
I call probabilities thus defined L-chances.
The best system is the one that strikes the best balance between
strength, simplicity and fit. The notions of strength and simplicity are
given to the demon and are taken for granted in this context, but the
2I also assume that one can make sense of PH in the current context, an assumption
that has been questioned by Earman (2006).
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notion of fit needs explicit definition. Every system assigns probabili-
ties to certain courses of history, among them the actual course; the fit
of the system is measured by the probability that it assigns to the ac-
tual course of history, i.e. by how likely it regards things that actually
happen. By definition systems that do not involve probabilistic laws
have perfect fit. As an illustration, consider a Humean mosaic that
consists of just ten outcomes of a coin flip: HHTHTTHHTT. Theory
T1 posits that all events are independent and sets p(H) = p(T ) = 0.5;
theory T2 shares the independence assumption but posits p(H) = 0.9
and p(T ) = 0.1. It follows that T1 has better fit than T2 because
(0.5)10 > (0.1)5(0.9)5.
Loewer’s suggestion is that Boltzmannian SM as introduced above
– the package of Hamiltonian mechanics, PH and PHSP – is a putative
best system of the sort just described (2001, 618; 2004, 1124) and that
PHSP probabilities can therefore be regarded as Humean chances.
But there is an obvious problem, namely reconciling determinism and
the existence of probabilistic laws, which Lewis himself thought was
impossible (1986, 118).
Loewer claims that Lewis was wrong about this and suggests that
introducing probabilities via initial conditions solves the problem:
‘[...] while there are chances different from 0 and 1 for
possible initial conditions the chances of any event A after
the initial time will be either 1 or 0 since A’s occurrence
or non-occurrence will be entailed by the initial state and
the deterministic laws. However, we can define a kind of
dynamical chance which I call ‘macroscopic chance’. The
macroscopic chance at t of event A is the probability given
by starting with the micro-canonical distribution over the
initial conditions and then conditionalising on the entire
macroscopic history of the world (including the low entropy
postulate) up until t. [...] this probability distribution is
completely compatible with deterministic laws since it con-
cerns only the initial conditions of the universe.’ (Loewer
2001, 618-19)3
Loewer does not tell us what exactly he means by ‘a kind of dy-
namical chance’, in what sense this chance is macroscopic, how its
3The same idea is described in Loewer (2004, 1124).
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values are calculated, and how it connects to the technical apparatus
of SM. I will now present how I think this proposal is best under-
stood and show that, on this reading, Loewer’s ‘macroscopic chances’
coincide with PHSP as formulated above.
As in Section 2, I take the system’s state at t > t0 to be the
macrostate Mt. We now need to determine the probability of the
event ‘being in set B ⊆ ΓMt at time t’. As I understand it, Loewer’s
proposal falls into two parts. The first is that the probability of an
event at a time t is ‘completely determined’ by the probability of
the corresponding event at time t0; that is, the probability of the
event ‘being in set B at time t’, pt(B), is equal to the probability
of ‘being in set B0 at time t0’ where B0 is, by definition, the set
that evolves into B under the dynamics of the system after time t
has elapsed. Formally, pt(B) = µ0(B0) = µ0(φ−t(B)), where µ0 is
the microcanonical distributino over the Past State, i.e. µ0( · ) =
µ( · ∩ ΓMp)/µ(ΓMp)
The second part is conditionalising on the entire macro history up
to time t, i.e a specification of the system’s macro state at each in-
stant of time between t0 and t. A possible macro history, for instance,
is that system is in macrostate M1 during the interval [t0, t1], in M5
during (t1, t2], in M7 during (t2, t3], etc., where t1, t2, t3, ... are the
instants of time at which the system changes from one macrostate
into another. What we are now expected to calculate is the proba-
bility of ‘being in set B at time t’ given the system’s macro history.
Let Qt be the set of all microstates in ΓMt that are compatible with
the entire past history of the system; i.e. it is the set of all x ∈ ΓMt
that lie on trajectories that for every t were in the ΓMk corresponding
to the actual macrostate of the system at t. The sought-after condi-
tional probability then is pt(B|Qt) = pt(B&Qt)/pt(Qt), provided that
pt(Qt) 6= 0, which, as we shall see, is the problematic condition.
Putting these two parts together we obtain the fundamental equa-
tion defining L-chances for deterministic systems:
pt(B|Qt) = µ0(φ−t(B ∩Qt))
µ0(φ−t(Qt))
, (1)
where, again, µ0( · ) = µ( · ∩ ΓMp)/µ(ΓMp).
The crucial thing to realise now is that due to the conservation of
the measure the expression for the conditional probability in PHSP
can be expressed as pt(B|Rt) = µ(φ−t(B∩Rt))/µ(φ−t(Rt)). Trivially,
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we can substitute µ0 for µ in this expression which makes it is equiva-
lent to Equation 1, if we treat Qt and Rt as equals. (In fact there is a
difference between them in that Rt only involves a conditionalisation
on PH, while Qt contains the entire past history. However, nothing
in PHSP depends on this and one could just as well include the entire
history in Rt.) Hence PHSP can be interpreted as attributing prob-
abilities to events at t > t0 solely on the basis of the microcanonical
measure over the initial conditions, which is precisely what Loewer
needs.
4 Problems with Fit
Loewer claims that SM as introduced above is the system that strikes
the best balance between simplicity, strength and fit. Trivially, this
implies that it can be ranked along these three dimensions. Simplicity
and strength are no more problematic in SM than they are in any
other context and I shall therefore not discuss them further here. The
problematic concept is fit.
The fit of a theory is measured in terms of the probability that it
assigns to the actual course of history. But what history? Given that
L-chances are calculated using the Lebesgue measure, which assigns
measure zero to any trajectory, they do not lead to a non-trivial rank-
ing of micro histories (trajectories in Γ). The right choice seems to be
to judge the fit of theory with respect to the system’s macro history.
What is the probability of a macro history? A first answer to this
question would be to simply use Equation 1 to calculate the probabil-
ity of a macro state at each instant of time and then multiply them
all, just as we did in the above example with the coins (with the only
difference that the probabilities are now not independent any more,
which is accounted for in Equation 1). This is plain nonsense. There
is an uncountable infinity of such probabilities and multiplying an un-
countable infinity of numbers is an ill-defined operation. Determining
the probability of a history by multiplying probabilities for individual
events in the history works fine as long as the events are discrete (like
coin flips), but it fails when we have a continuum.
Maybe this was too crude a stab at the problem and when taking
the right sorts of limits things work out fine. Let us discretise time by
dividing the real axis into small intervals of length δ, then calculating
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the probabilities at the instants t0, t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ etc., multiply them
(there are only countably many now), and then take the limit δ → 0.
This would work if the pt(B|Qt) depended in a way on δ that would
assure that the limit exists. This is not the case. In fact, for all t > t1
(i.e. after the first change of macrostate), the pt(B|Qt) do not exist
because Qt has measure zero, and this irrespective of δ. This can
be seen as follows. Take the above example of a macro history and
consider an instant t ∈ (t1, t2] when the system is in macrostate M5.
To calculate the probability of the system being in M5 at t we need
to determine Qt, the set of all microstates in ΓM5 compatible with the
past macro history. Now, these points must be such that they were
were in M1 at t1 and in M5 just an instant later (i.e. for any ε > 0, at
t1 + ε the system’s state is in ΓM5). The mechanical systems we are
considering have global solutions (or at least solutions for the entire
interval [t0, tf ], where tf is the time when the system ceases to exist)
and trajectories in such systems have finite phase velocity; that is, a
phase point x in Γ cannot cross a finite distance in no time. From this
it follows that the only points that satisfy the condition of being in
M1 at t1 and inM5 just instant later are the ones that at t1 lie exactly
on the boundary between M1 and M5. But the boundary of a 6n− 1
dimensional region is 6n − 2 dimensional and threfore has measure
zero. Therefore Qt has measure zero for all t > t1, and accordingly
pt(B|Qt) does not exist for t > t1, no matter what B is. Needless to
say, this renders the limit δ → 0 obsolete.
The source of the problem is the conjunction of three elements:
(1) the posit that time is continuous, (2) the assumption that the
transition from one macrostate to another one takes place at a precise
instant, (3) the posit that we conditionalise on the entire macro history
of the system. We have to give up at least one of these to obtain
non-zero pt(B|Qt). The problem is that all three elements either
seem reasonable or are deeply entrenched in the theory and cannot
be renounced without far-reaching consequences.
The first option, discretising time, would solve the problem because
if we assume that time is discrete the macro history is discrete too.
If we only consider, say, the events ‘being in ΓM1 at instant τ1’ and
‘being in ΓM5 at instant τ2’, where τ1 ∈ [t0, t1] and τ2 ∈ (t1, t2], sets
of finite measure can move from ΓM1 to ΓM5 and Qt no longer needs
to have measure zero. The problem with this suggestion is that it
is ad hoc and defeats the purpose of SM. If we believe that classical
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mechanics is the fundamental theory governing the micro constituents
of the universe and set out to explain the behaviour of the universe in
terms of its laws, not much seems to be gained if such an explanation
can only be had at the expense of profoundly modifying these laws.
The second suggestion would be to allow for finite transition times
between macrostates, i.e. allowing for there to be periods during which
it is indeterminate in which macrostate the system is. Given that
states move with finite phase velocity, this would amount to intro-
ducing ‘transition zones’, i.e. ‘belts’ between different ΓMk consisting
of microstates which neither belong to one nor the other macrostate.
This suggestion is not without merit as one could argue that sharp
boundaries between macro-states are indeed a mathematical idealisa-
tion that is ultimately unjustifiable from a physics perspective. How-
ever, giving up the assumption that the ΓMk have sharp boundaries
and together form a partition of ΓE would amount to a serious change
in SM itself, and it would remain to be seen whether a theory based
on this assumption turns out to be workable.
The third option denies that we we should conditionalise on the
complete macro history. The idea is that even though time at bottom
is continuous, the macro history takes record of he system’s macrostate
only at discrete instants and is oblivious about what happens between
these. That is, what we should conditionalise on is the discrete macro
history (DMH): Mp at τ0, Mτ1 at τ1, Mτ2 at τ2, ..., Mτj−1 at τj−1 and
Mτj at τj , where t0 =: τ0 ≤ τ1 ≤ ... ≤ τj−1 ≤ τj := tf is a finite
number of instants of time and the Mτi the system’s macro state at
time τi.4 This solves the problem because when conditionalising on a
discrete macro history Qt no longer necessarily is of measure zero.
This is at once the most feasible and the most problematic sugges-
tion. It is feasible because it does not require revisions in the structure
of the theory. It is problematic because we have given up the notion
that the fit of a theory has to be best with respect to the complete
history of the world, and replaced it with the weaker requirement that
fit be best for a partial history. (And mind you, the point is not that
the fit of the full history is in practice too complicated to calculate
and we therefore settle for a more tractable notion; the point is that
the fit of a complete macro history is simply not defined because the
4I assume j to be finite. There is a further problem with infinite sequences (Elga 2004).
The difficulties I discuss in this section and the next are independent of that problem and
Elga’s solution is available also in the present context.
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relevant conditional probabilities do not exist.) From the point of view
of Lewis’ theory this seems unmotivated. Fit, like truth, is a semantic
concept characterising the relation between the theory and the world,
and if the Humean mosaic has continuous events in it there should
still be a matter of fact about what the fit of the theory is.
Moreover, even if one was willing to believe that a discrete version
of fit was satisfactory, it is not clear whether this leads to useful results.
Depending on which particular instants of time one chooses to measure
fit, one can get widely different results. Conditionalising on a DMH
would be useful only if it was the case that the fit rankings came out
the same no matter what choice of instants we make. There is at least
a question whether this is the case.
5 The Putative Best System Is Not
the Best System
I now assume that a DMH notion of fit can be defended in one way or
another.5 Then a further problem emerges: the package consisting of
Hamiltonian Mechanics, PH and PHSP in fact is not the best system.
The reason for this is that we can always improve the fit of a system
if we choose a measure that, rather than being uniform over ΓMp , is
somehow peaked over those initial conditions that are compatible with
the entire DMH.
Let us make this more precise. The probability of the DMH is
p(DMH) = pτ0(Bτ0 |Qτ0) ... pτj−1(Bτj−1 |Qτj−1), where the Bτi are
those subsets of Mτi that evolve into Mτi+1 under the evolution of
the system. One can then prove that
p(DMH) = µ0[Γp ∩ φ−τ1(Γ1) ∩ ... ∩ φ−τj (Γj)] (2)
where Γp := ΓMp and Γi := ΓMτi for i = 1, ..., j. Now define N := Γp ∩
φ−τ1(Γ1) ... φ−τj (Γj). The fit of system is measured by the probability
that it assigns to the actual DMH, which is given by Equation 2. It is
a straightforward consequence of this equation that the fit of a system
can be improved by replacing µ0 by a measure µP that is peaked over
N , i.e. µP (N) > µ0(N) and µP (Γp \N) < µ0(Γp \N) while µP (Γp) =
5I make this choice for convenience; the problem that I describe in this section also
arises for the other two options.
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µ0(Γp). Fit becomes maximal (i.e. p(DMH) = 1) if, for instance, we
choose the measure µN that assigns all the weight to N and none to
Γp \ N : for any set B ⊆ Γp we have µN (B) := kµ0(B ∩ N), where
k = 1/µ0(N) (provided that µ0(N) 6= 0). Trivially, N contains the
actual initial condition of the unverse. A simpler and more convenient
distributions that yields maximal fit is a Dirac delta function over the
actual initial condition.
If there is such a simple way to improve (and even maximise) fit,
why does the demon not provide us with a system comprising µN or
a delta function? Coming up with such a system is not a problem for
the demon, as, by assumption, he knows the entire Humean mosaic,
which contains the exact initial condition.
A reason to prefer µ0 to other measures might be that these make
the system less simple and that this loss in simplicity is not com-
pensated by a corresponding gain in fit and strength. This seems
implausible. Handling a dirac delta function rather than µ0 does not
render the system more complicated while the gain in fit is consider-
able. Hence simplicity does not seem to provide reason to prefer µ0
to other measures that have better fit.
6 Outlook: Epistemic Probabilities Af-
ter All
The system consisting of Hamiltonian mechanics, PH, and PHSP is
not the best system and therefore PHSP probabilities cannot be in-
terpreted as Humean chances. In this section I first want suggest that
the probabilities in this system are best understood as epistemic prob-
abilities of sorts and then indicate how this view could be defended
against some common objections.
Every theory involving probabilities must answer the question of
what these probabilities are probabilities for. The initial conditions
approach to chance does not seem to have an answer to this ques-
tion. The universe has exactly one initial micro condition and there is
nothing chancy about this condition. How, then, can we understand
a probability distribution over initial conditions? The only answer
seems to be that this distribution reflects our ignorance about the
systems’s initial micro condition; all we know is the system’s initial
macrostate and so we put a probability distribution over the micro
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conditions compatible with that macrostate which reflects our lack of
knowledge.
How these epistemic probabilities should be understood is a ques-
tion that I cannot discuss here. Let me just indicate that there are at
least two options. The first, a version of objective Bayesianism, ap-
peals to Jayenes’ maximum entropy principle, which indeed instructs
us to prefer µ0 to alternative measures because, given the informa-
tion about the system’s macro state, µ0 maximises the (continuous)
Shannon entropy. The other alternative is to revise Lewis’ account in
a way that builds epistemic restrictions of the users of theories into
the selection criteria for systems. Hoefer’s (2007) theory of Humean
chance makes room for this possibility.
There are two main complaints about an epistemic interpretation
of SM probabilities. The first points out that the thermodynamic
entropy is a property of a physical system and that SB coincides with
it up to a constant. This, so the argument goes, is inexplicable on
the basis of an epistemic approach to probabilities.6 This is wrong
because SB is defined in terms of the measure of certain chunks of
phase space and probabilities (no matter how we interpret them) have
simply nothing to with it.
The second complaint concerns the alleged causal efficacy of human
knowledge. The point becomes clear in the following – rhetorical –
questions by Albert:7
‘Can anybody seriously think that it is somehow necessary,
that it is somehow a priori, that the particles that make
up the material world must arrange themselves in accord
with what we know, with what we happen to have looked
into? Can anybody seriously think that our merely being
ignorant of the exact microconditions of thermodynamic
systems plays some part in bringing it about, in making it
the case, that (say) milk dissolves in coffee? How could
that be?’ (Albert 2000, 64, original emphasis)
It can’t be, and no one should think that it could. Proponents of
epistemic probabilities need not believe in parapsychology. What un-
derlies this objection is the mistaken view that PHSP probabilities
6This point is often made in conversation, but I have been unable to locate it in print.
7Redhead (1995, 27-28, 32-33), Loewer (2001, 611), Goldstein (2001, 48), and Meacham
(2005 287-8) make similar points.
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play a part in bringing about things in the world. Of course the cool-
ing down of drinks and the boiling of kettles has nothing to do with
what anybody thinks or knows about them; but they have nothing to
do with the probabilities attached to these events either. Drinks cool
down and kettles boil because the universe’s initial condition is such
that under the dynamics of the system it evolves into a state in which
this happens. All we need to explain why things happen is the initial
condition and the dynamics.
Last but not least, the decision to conditionalise on DMH rather
than the full macro history seems to square better with an epistemic
approach to probabilities. For these reasons I suggest that we take
seriously the option to interpret SM probabilities epistemically.
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